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Historians have generally claimed that, during the War of 1812, unlike in earlier peri-
ods, French Canadians eagerly rallied to the British cause and willingly fought to
defend British North America from American invasion. Nearly all studies of French-
Canadian participation in the war, however, focus on the Battle of Châteauguay in
1813, and few examine the first year of the war. A close look at French Canadians’
reactions to the outbreak of the War of 1812 would indicate that they were hardly
unanimous in their support. A detailed study of the largest and most violent act of
resistance — a riot that broke out at Lachine at the beginning of July 1812 — reveals
some of the reasons why so many habitants refused to perform their militia duty.
Les historiens ont généralement soutenu que, pendant la guerre de 1812, contraire-
ment aux périodes précédentes, les Canadiens français se sont alliés avec enthou-
siasme à la cause britannique et ont volontairement combattu pour défendre
l’Amérique du Nord britannique face à l’invasion américaine. Mais presque toutes
les études consacrées à la participation canadienne-française à la guerre portent sur
la bataille de Châteauguay, en 1813, et très peu sont consacrées à la première année
de la guerre. Un regard sur les réactions des Canadiens français suite au déclenche-
ment de la guerre de 1812 démontre que ceux-ci étaient loin d’offrir un appui
unanime. À travers une étude détaillée de l’acte de résistance le plus important et le
plus violent contre la guerre – l’émeute qu éclata à Lachine au début du mois de juil-
let 1812 – l’auteur cherche à élucider des raisons permettant d’expliquer pourquoi
les habitants refusèrent d’accomplir leur devoir militaire.
WHEN WAR broke out between Britain and the United States at the begin-
ning of the summer of 1812, Lower Canada was in turmoil. Military leaders
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were unable to muster the militia in the numbers that they had hoped, Amer-
ican agents were in the country preaching the message of defiance to British
rule, and riots and mutinies spread across the province. On July 1, 1812,
merely a week after Lower Canada learned of the American declaration of
war,1 a disturbance developed at Lachine that was so grave that Montreal mil-
itary and political leaders feared the beginning of civil war. For two days, the
men of Pointe Claire and the surrounding communities, many carrying arms,
took to the streets in open protest against the actions of military officials. The
crowd succeeded in freeing one prisoner who had refused to present himself
for militia duty, and many men were prepared to march to La Prairie and “lib-
erate” all the members of the community who had been drafted into the
Select Embodied Militia. Only by firing into the crowd were the authorities
able to put an end to the incident.
This outbreak of rebellion at Lachine, like the larger context of French-
Canadian resistance to militia duty during the War of 1812, has been largely
forgotten. Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, historians have conflated
French-Canadian participation in the war with the mythic repression of an
American invasion at the Battle of Châteauguay in 1813.2 In his history of the
French-Canadian militia, for example, Benjamin Sulte mentions the riot at
Lachine — “le seul incident fâcheux de ce genre” — but goes on to state that
“notre élément a accompli son devoir en conscience”, making it clear to the
reader that French Canadians sparkled at Châteauguay.3 The victory at Châ-
teauguay, and the fact that the French-Canadian elite supported the war from
its beginning, has led many historians to conclude that French Canadians in
general remained loyal throughout the conflict.4 According to Arthur Lower,
1 According to Stephen Sewell, the “war was known at Montreal and at Queenston in Upper Canada by
private expresses, in six days after its declaration at Washington [June 18, 1812], and at Quebec and York,
the seats of Government, in twenty four hours more”. Veritas [Stephen Sewell], The Letters of Veritas,
re-published from the Monteal Herald, containing A succinct narrative of the military administration of
Sir George Prevost, during his command in The Canadas; Whereby it will appear manifest, that the merit
of preserving them from conquest belongs not to him (Montreal, printed by W. Gray, July 1815), p. 7.
2 French-Canadian participation in the Battle of Châteauguay is by far the most studied aspect of the war
in Lower Canada. For the principal works on the battle, see Martin F. Auger, “French Canadian Partic-
ipation in the War of 1812: A Social Study of the Voltigeurs canadiens”, Canadian Military History, vol.
10, no. 3 (Summer 2001), pp. 23–41; Michelle Guitard, The Militia of the Battle of Châteauguay: A
Social History (Ottawa: Minister of the Environment, 1983); Benjamin Sulte, La bataille de Château-
guay (Quebec: Renault, 1899); Victor Suthren, “The Battle of Châteauguay”, Canadian Historical Sites:
Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History, no. 11 (1974); Ernest Cruikshank, “Record of the Ser-
vices of Canadian Regiments in the War of 1812, Part IV: The Canadian Voltigeurs”, Canadian Military
Institute: Selected Papers from the Transactions, vol. 10 (1900). For a look at de Salaberry, see Patrick
J. Wohler, Charles de Salaberry: Soldier of the Empire, Defender of Quebec (Toronto: Dundurn Press,
1984).
3 Benjamin Sulte, Histoire de la milice canadienne-française, 1760–1897 (Montreal, 1897), pp. 27, 32.
4 One important study of French Canadians and the War of 1812 does not follow these general historio-
graphical lines, however. See Luc Lépine’s excellent, yet unpublished, MA thesis, “La participation des
Canadiens français à la Guerre de 1812 (Université de Montréal, 1986).
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“when summoned to arms”, French Canadians “fought bravely against the
invader”.5 Fernand Ouellet, for his part, argues that, in “resisting the invad-
ers, the people felt they were defending their interests and protecting their
cultural heritage”.6 Finally, Martin Auger, the historian who has most
recently written on the subject, states that the “impressive participation in the
war effort helped redefine the military character of French Canadians” and
“dissipated the British authorities’ fears that French Canadians were disloyal
subjects”.7 The disturbances in the summer months of 1812, according to this
reading, are mere aberrations, exceptions to the general willingness of French
Canadians to rally to arms and defend the British flag.
At the beginning of the War of 1812, however, French Canadians did not
unconditionally and universally respond to the raising of the militia and the
government’s call to loyalty. A close reading of the trial records of those
charged in the largest collective act of resistance, the Lachine riot, helps us to
explain some of the reasons why so many habitants refused to fight and why
the appeals to loyalty made by the colonial administration, the French-Cana-
dian bourgeoisie, and the clergy had such little effect. In this sense, I build on
Jean-Pierre Wallot’s previous work on the Lachine riot, the one existing study
of the disturbance.8 Although Wallot provides an important detailed account
of the rebellion, he makes little effort to understand the riot from the perspec-
tive of the insurgents. For him, the collective act of resistance can be
explained by the particular “circumstances” that prevailed at Lachine and by
the fact that “partout et toujours, en guerre et surtout en paix, les hommes
5 A. R. M. Lower, Canadians in the Making: A Social History of Canada (Toronto: Longmans, Green,
1958), p. 177.
6 Fernand Ouellet, Lower Canada 1791–1840: Social Change and Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart, 1980), p. 106; see also his Economic and Social History of Quebec, 1760–1850: Structures and
Conjunctures (Ottawa: Institute of Canadian Studies, 1980).
7 Auger, “French Canadian Participation in the War of 1812”, p. 23. The War of 1812 in Upper Canada has
been subject to very different historiographical treatment. For nearly 50 years, Upper Canadian histori-
ans have been challenging the myth that, during the War of 1812, the inhabitants of the province were
overwhelmingly loyal to the British government and, through the militia, played a central and decisive
role in defending against American invasion. In 1958 C. P. Stacey delivered his well-known address to
the annual meeting of the Ontario Historical Society that rejected the “militia myth”. The paper, “The
War of 1812 in Canadian History”, can be found in Morris Zaslow, ed., Defended Borders (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1964). The classic history of the War of 1812 in this genre is J. MacKay Hitsman, The
Incredible War of 1812: A Military History, updated by Donald E. Graves (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio,
[1965] 1999). The theme has recently been taken up in the many works of Donald Graves, the leading
military historian of the War of 1812. For an important study that challenges the stereotype of a British-
loving, Upper Canadian elite, see Jane Errington, The Lion, the Eagle, and Upper Canada: A Developing
Colonial Ideology (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987). For a social his-
tory of the War of 1812 in Upper Canada that demonstrates the general lack of enthusiasm of Upper
Canadians for war, see George Sheppard, Plunder, Profit, and Paroles: A Social History of the War of
1812 in Upper Canada (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994).
8 Jean-Pierre Wallot, “Une émeute à Lachine contre la ‘conscription’ (1812)”, Un Québec qui bougeait.
Trame socio-politique du Québec au tournant du XIXe siècle (Montreal: Fides, 1973). The study origi-
nally appeared in the Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française, vol. 18 (1964–1965).
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n’aiment pas se faire enrégimenter”.9 The only sustained study of the Lachine
riot therefore paradoxically offers a lengthy discussion of the event itself,
while paying little attention to the habitants’ motivations and downplaying
the event’s importance in the larger context of resistance that swept Lower
Canada.
Loyalty
The disaffection that prevailed in the French-Canadian countryside, and the
possibility of a widespread refusal to perform militia duty, did not come as a
surprise to the English–speaking colonial elite. According to F. Murray
Greenwood, during both the closing years of the eighteenth century and the
years leading up to the War of 1812, members of the English-speaking elite
were incessantly worried about the loyalty of rural French Canadians and
thought constantly about how they would react in the face of foreign inva-
sion.10 In the spring of 1812, just months before the outbreak of war, Sir
George Prevost, Governor in Chief and commander of British forces in North
America, knew that it was necessary “to act with great caution” in his plans to
mobilize for war, as the “seeds of disaffection and disorder have been sown
among [French Canadians]”.11
Prevost was therefore greatly reassured by the fact that the various factions
of the French-Canadian elite also preached loyalty and patriotism in the face
of American aggression. The old aristocratic families saw the war as a chance
to revive a fading military glory,12 and both the clergy and the bourgeoisie,
for differing reasons, backed the mobilization for war. For the clergy, the war
was an opportunity to demonstrate its loyalty to the British government, and
its support for the war fit into a long tradition of collaboration with the vari-
ous colonial administrations. Priests were therefore ordered to remind the
habitants that “notre religion sera en danger de se perdre par la présence de
ces ennemis qui nous menacent, et qui sont sans principes et sans moeurs”.
The habitants had to feel “plus que jamais la douceur des liens qui les
attachent avec tant d’avantages pour eux au Gouvernement paternel de la
Mère-Patrie”.13 At least one influential member of the clergy — Jean-
Jacques Lartigue — employed the language of nationalism in his attempt to
9 Wallot, Un Québec qui bougeait, pp. 108, 135.
10 Greenwood cites much evidence indicating that the English-speaking elite was right in thinking that,
if French troops had invaded in the opening years of the nineteenth century, the loyalty of French-
Canadian habitants was far from assured. F. Murray Greenwood, Legacies of Fear: Law and Politics
in Quebec in the Era of the French Revolution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Osgoode
Society, 1993), pp. 199-201.
11 Prevost to Lord Liverpool, April 20, 1812, cited in Lépine, “La participation des Canadiens Français
à la Guerre de 1812”, p. 26.
12 Ouellet, Lower Canada 1791–1840, p. 102.
13 “Lettre Circulaire, Vic. Gén. Deschenaux à messieurs les curés, juin 29, 1812”, in Mandements,
lettres pastorales et circulaires des Évêques de Québec (publié par Mgr Têtu et l’abbé C.-O. Gagnon),
vol. III (Quebec: Imprimerie Générale A. Coté et Cie, 1888), pp. 86–87.
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convince habitants to fight.14 Habitant men had not only to “spill their
blood” for the “honour of the King”, he argued, but also for “l’honneur de
cette brave nation canadienne à laquelle nous nous glorifions d’appartenir”.15
Habitants had to fight to prove that they were worthy children of the “Cana-
diens” who had fought so bravely in the past.16 Lartigue’s appeals to nation-
alism relied on a gendered language that pit masculine strength against
feminine helplessness.17 British blood, he said, would flow in Lower Can-
ada’s fields, and that blood would not be spilt to protect the British Isles, but
to defend “vos femmes, vos enfants, vos parents, vos propriétés, votre Reli-
gion, vos temples, en un mot, tout ce qui vous est le plus cher”.18 If French
Canadian men wanted to avoid the shame of having their women and chil-
dren defended by British soldiers, it was crucial that they respond to the call
to arms.19
Unlike the support of the war by the Catholic clergy, that provided by the
Parti Canadien, the party of the French-Canadian bourgeoisie, was a result of
a new climate of cooperation in the Lower Canadian Assembly. In the early
years of the nineteenth century, the Assembly had become increasingly polar-
ized along linguistic lines, and two antagonistic newspapers had been founded
that nurtured the ideological divisions in the province: Le Canadien articulat-
ing the concerns and interests of the French-Canadian middle class,20 and the
Quebec Mercury voicing the English-speaking merchants’ desire to
“unfrenchify” the province. As the first decade of the century wore on, the
14 By employing nationalist rhetoric, Lartigue’s appeal to loyalty differed from those of other members
of the clergy, including Bishop Plessis. For Ouellet, when “Plessis addressed French Canadians he
was addressing the Catholic faithful and Catholic subjects”. Lartigue’s use of nationalist language
was, therefore, “an innovation”. Ouellet, Lower Canada 1791–1840, p. 101.
15 “Sermon de M. Lartigue”, p.s.s., July 5, 1812, Pointe Claire, p. 303.
16 “Sermon de M. Lartigue”, July 12, 1812, Lachine, p. 308.
17 For a look at the gendered nature of the public language of Upper Canada during the war, see Cecilia
Morgan, Public Men and Virtuous Women: The Gendered Language of Religion and Politics in Upper
Canada, 1791–1850 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). The gendered nature of “loyalty”
and “patriotism”, Morgan argues, cannot be separated from the power structures of Upper Canadian
society, and can be at least partly explained by the fact that patriarchy and paternalism “were central
features of early Upper Canadian society” (p. 54). While no comparative study yet exists that
explores the gendered nature of public language in Lower Canada, there is reason to believe that, dur-
ing the War of 1812, the Lower Canadian elite employed similar metaphors of feminine helplessness
and the need for male citizens to fend off the danger of an American invasion.
18 “Sermon de M. Lartigue”, July 12, 1812, Lachine, p. 307.
19 Father Boucher also used highly gendered rhetoric to denounce deserters. Deserting “à sa femme,” he
argued, “c’est déserter à l’ennemi.” By associating women and the enemy, Boucher was attempting to
convince members of the militia that they had to defend something larger than their families and their
local communities and that anything less was submitting to the enemy. Boucher to Plessis, Laprairie,
November 15, 1813, cited in Guitard, The Militia of the Battle of Châteauguay, p. 60.
20 According to historian Denis Monière, the consolidation of the Parti Canadien in the Assembly and
the establishment of Le Canadien as its political organ symbolized the formation of a new ‘class”, the
petty bourgeoisie, with its own nationalist ideology. Denis Monière, Le développement des idéologies
au Québec : des origines à nos jours (Montreal: Québec/Amérique, 1977), p. 122.
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Parti Canadien became locked in a fierce battle with the anglophone merchant
class in the Assembly, the Executive Council, and especially (after 1807)
Governor Sir James Craig.21 With war fast approaching, the British govern-
ment recognized the danger of the political divisions in the colony and
appointed Sir George Prevost to take over as governor in 1811. Almost imme-
diately, Prevost began to pursue a policy of conciliation with Lower Canada’s
French-speaking elite. Fluent in French and open to compromise, Prevost bal-
anced his patronage appointments between members of the French-Canadian
elite and the Anglo merchants, and he restored prominent French-Canadian
leaders to their positions as officers in the militia.22 Believing that if French-
Canadian leaders supported the colonial government then habitants would
naturally follow suit,23 he appointed three French Canadians to the Legisla-
tive Council and increased the status of Bishop Plessis, head of the Roman
Catholic Church in the colony.24
Because of Prevost’s efforts, and because members of the Parti Canadien
believed that the interests of the French-Canadian nation were best served by
remaining in the British Empire,25 the Parti Canadien did not block the war
effort in the Assembly, and the Militia Act was passed with its support. The
French-Canadian bourgeoisie felt that it was in the best interests of the nation
to remain loyal to the British government; to continue to enjoy British lib-
erty,26 it was necessary to fight off the immoral and excessively democratic
American republic. In February 1812 the Lower Canadian Assembly pre-
sented Prevost with an address that spoke of “la loyauté, l’unanimité et le zèle
des Sujets Canadiens de Sa Majesté”,27 and in the province’s newspapers the
bourgeoisie attempted to convince French Canadians that they were a distinct
people who lived well under British rule.28 “Denis”, for example, wrote in the
Montreal Gazette in July 1812, “Nous sommes sujets Anglois, sous la domi-
21 Yvan Lamonde, Histoire sociale des idées au Québec, 1760–1896 (Montreal: Fides, 2000), p. 53.
22 For an account of the above developments, see Helen Taft Manning, The Revolt of French Canada,
1800–1835: A Chapter in the History of the British Commonwealth (Toronto: Macmillan, 1962).
23 On May 19, 1812, Prevost told both the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council, “You have
wisely bestowed much of your labour upon the improvement of the Militia System; from the Law
which you have passed upon this subject, and from the increased means you have thereby afforded
me for the defence of the Province, I confidently look forward to fresh proofs of the loyalty, zeal and
public spirit of its inhabitants” (Montreal Gazette, June 1, 1812).
24 Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812, p. 30. See also Taft Manning, The Revolt of French Canada.
25 See Ouellet, Lower Canada 1791–1840, pp. 102–104.
26 For a look at how British liberty and the British constitution were seen by the Parti Canadien, see
Lawrence Smith, “Le Canadien and the British Constitution, 1806–1810”, Canadian Historical
Review, vol. 38, no. 2 (June 1957), pp. 93–108.
27 The address is printed in the Montreal Gazette, March 9, 1812.
28 Even if we take into account the fact that many newspapers may have been read aloud in various
communities, however, there was a significant limitation on their effectiveness. Between 1760 and
1820, only 16 per cent of Lower Canada’s population was literate, and the literacy rate varied greatly
depending on one’s sex, class, and place of residence (literacy rates were highest for English-speak-
ing men living in cities). Lamonde, Histoire sociale des idées au Québec, p. 67.
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nation du meilleur des Rois, dont la main libérale n’a cessé de verser sur nous
des bienfaits, et dont le Ciel n’a prolongé le règne, que pour le bonheur des
peuples confiés à ses soins.” It was time, he continued, to show “que nous ne
sommes pas des ingrats” and to preserve the honour of the name “Canadien”.
Habitants had to fight “pour la défense de la patrie et de l’honneur” because,
if they did not, “il n’y aura plus pour nous d’honneur, de patrie, de bonheur,
ni d’espérance”.29
Resistance
Both the bourgeoisie and the clergy appealed to the rhetoric of loyalty and
patriotism to convince habitants to rally to arms and fight for the larger inter-
ests of religion and nation. Despite their best efforts, however, they had little
success in convincing habitants of the need to fight. Resistance to militia ser-
vice was nothing new for French Canadians, and their failure to respond to
militia duty in 1812 fit into a larger pattern of non-cooperation that stretched
back at least to the beginning of British rule.30 Between 1779 and 1783, for
example, 40 per cent of all criminal prosecutions in the district of Montreal
were for militia offences.31 When in 1794 the government attempted to raise
the militia in anticipation of war with the United States, there was widespread
refusal to comply with the law. The situation was aggravated by rumours that
the British were planning to send young French Canadians to fight abroad.32
In the district of Quebec, 34 of 42 parishes rejected the law, and in Montreal
500 people gathered to protest openly at Côte des Neiges.33 Four parishes
even mounted armed patrols to ensure that the 1794 militia law could not be
enforced.34
29 “Denis”, Montreal Gazette, July 27, 1812. Captain Perrault, for his part, attempted to recruit volun-
teers for the Canadian Voltigeurs by telling habitants, “braves et loyaux compatriotes”, that “le sang
qui animait vos pères coule encore dans vos veines”. Habitant men had to fight for “le salut de vos
propriétés et de votre Religion, la sureté et le repos de vos familles”, as well as for the great honour of
the King. But the real interests that the habitants would be defending were the interests of the nation.
Speaking of the Voltigeurs, Perrault announced proudly, “Des Canadiens seuls entreront dans ce
corps; et vos Officiers seront tous Canadiens, pris dans la Milice. Aucune autre personne née hors de
ce pays, ne pourra être admis [...] c’est pour nous seuls et notre Province que ce corps est formé”
(Capitaine Perrault, “Voltigeurs Canadiens”, Montreal Gazette, May 11, 1812).
30 For further discussion of resistance to militia duty and other instances of “collective action” in early
French Canada (although focusing mostly on New France), see Terrence Crowley, “ ‘Thunder Gusts’:
Popular Disturbances in Early French Canada”, Historical Papers (Canadian Historical Association,
1979), pp. 11–32.
31 See Donald Fyson, “The Judicial Prosecution of Crime in the Longue Durée: Quebec 1712–1965”, in
Jean-Marie Fecteau and Janice Harvey, eds., La régulation sociale entre l’acteur et l’institution :
pour une problématique historique de l’interaction (Quebec: Presses de l’Université du Québec,
2005), pp. 85–119.
32 Greenwood, Legacies of Fear, pp. 81–82.
33 Lamonde, Histoire sociale des idées au Québec, p. 44.
34 Crowley, “ ‘Thunder Gusts’ ”, p. 29. Further discussion of the 1794 riots can be found in Greenwood,
Legacies of Fear, pp. 80–83.
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As another war with the United States was fast approaching, however, the
shortage of British regular troops in the province meant that the government
had little choice but to mobilize the militia. In 1812 the Militia Act was
strengthened, militia expenditures were increased from £2,500 to £12,000,
and the three components of the militia were mobilized. The Sedentary Mili-
tia, composed of all able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 50, was
meant to protect the home front, and it began drilling throughout the spring
and early summer of 1812. The Select Embodied Militia, composed of con-
scripts between the ages of 18 and 30, was charged with the defence of border
regions, and 2,000 men were conscripted in May 1812 to serve for a three-
month period. Finally, the third component of the Lower Canadian militia
was composed of volunteer corps, the most well-known of which was the
Canadian Voltigeurs.35
Lack of popular support for the war deeply concerned British leaders and
raised the Americans’ expectations of an easy victory. When the order was
issued for the conscription of 2,000 men, military and civil leaders realized
how far those feelings of disaffection had reached. According to Stephen
Sewell, conscription “occasioned great discontents over the Province”.36
Word of Lower Canada’s militia problems even spread to New York state,
and the state’s governor, Daniel Tompkins, was understandably excited about
the news. In a letter to General P. B. Porter, Tompkins transcribed informa-
tion that he had received: “a large number of Canadians were at Lackeane
[Lachine] to be drafted for Military service, but refused to bear arms & that
the troops at Montreal were sent to that place, ... there was very considerable
firing supposed to be between the troops sent out of Montreal & the Mili-
tia.”37 Then, writing to Colonel R. Macomb, Tompkins stated that, in the
fighting between the militia and the regulars, eleven members of the militia
had been killed and that, in the case of an invasion, half of the militia would
desert and join the American side.38
While Tompkins was obviously wrong in his assessment that half of the
militia would join the American invaders, there were reasons for him to be
encouraged. When the government attempted to conscript men into the Select
Embodied Militia, habitants throughout the colony failed to report for duty.
Resistance to militia duty was, as in earlier periods, largely a rural phenome-
35 Auger, “French Canadian Participation in the War of 1812", p. 24; Guitard, The Militia of the Battle of
Châteauguay, p. 11.
36 Veritas [Stephen Sewell], “To the Editor of the Montreal Herald”, April 1815, in The Letters of Veri-
tas, pp. 8–9.
37 Governor Tompkins to Genl. P. B. Porter, Albany, July 8, 1812. The governor expressed the same sen-
timents in a letter to General Hall on July 8, 1812. In Daniel D. Tompkins, Public Papers of Daniel D.
Tompkins, Governor of New York, 1807–1817, vol. 3, introduction by Hugh Hastings (Albany: J. B.
Lyon Company, 1902), pp. 21–23.
38 Governor Tompkins to Col. R. Macomb, Albany, July 11, 1812, in Tompkins, Public Papers of
Daniel D. Tompkins, pp. 26–27.
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non.39 The vast majority of those conscripted to the Select Embodied Militia
(87.6 per cent) were drawn from rural parishes, and 77 per cent were listed as
either farmers or rural labourers.40 Rural farmers and labourers, worried
about bringing in the harvest and helping provide for their families, had little
interest in joining the Select Embodied Militia and consequently did not
respond well to the conscription order. Of the 2,000 men conscripted, only
1,332, or 66 per cent, ever reported for duty.41
The Riot at Lachine
The riot that broke out on the first of July at Lachine was a manifestation of
this larger reluctance of rural farmers to perform militia duty.42 The incident
began when a group of residents asked the local officer of the militia, Captain
Thibodeau, if their parish could be exempt from conscription for the Select
Embodied Militia. The request was not taken seriously, and tensions rose
when, in the parish of Pointe Claire, only 26 of the 59 men conscripted
reported for duty (and four of these deserted almost immediately).43 The com-
39 In the cities, the situation was different. When the Canadian Voltigeurs, the colony’s most celebrated
volunteer corps, began looking for men to volunteer for service, the unit’s officers looked to the urban
unemployed. Of the volunteers for the Voltigeurs, 82 per cent were classified as either craftsmen or
urban labourers, and 61.2 per cent were drawn from an urban environment (farmers accounted for only
3.6 per cent of the volunteers). This is not to say, of course, that corps drawn mostly from urban areas
did not experience their own problems. The Voltigeurs, for example, had significant difficulties with
insubordination and with desertion. In June 1812 de Salaberry wrote distressingly of troubles in the
corps: “It is truly mortifying to me”, he wrote, to have to report “a mutiny of that part of the Corps raised
in the district of Montreal, encamped on Crown land of Chambly”. Soldiers complained about the short
allowance of bread and provisions and feared being enlisted into the regular British army. The rumours
were so widely diffused and the discontent so widespread that, according to Jacques Viger, a captain in
the Voltigeurs, there were even “de murmures et de menaces de quitter en masse”. While the corps did
not massively desert during the mutiny at Chambly, persistent desertion did seriously hurt the unit. In
June 1812, 22 members of the Voltigeurs illegally left the corps, followed by 38 more in July. By the
end of the conflict, the Voltigeurs counted 299 cases of desertion, amounting to roughly 42.7 per cent
of all those who had enlisted. Guitard, The Militia of the Battle of Châteauguay, pp. 28–31; de Salaberry
at Chambly to Freer, June 18, 1812, in William Wood, ed., Selected British Documents of the Canadian
War of 1812, vol. 1 (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1920), pp. 314–315; Lépine, “La participation
des Canadiens Français à la Guerre de 1812”, pp. 97–100; Auger, “French Canadian Participation in the
War of 1812”, p. 31.
40 Guitard, The Militia of the Battle of Châteauguay, p. 31.
41 When men did report for duty, moreover, they were not always entirely obedient. In an incident com-
pletely disconnected from the riot at Lachine, on August 13, 1812, a riot broke out at Pointe-Levy.
One member of the militia, François Roi, refused to wear his uniform. Cries and yells ensued, and
members of the militia began to revolt. Two companies of regular British soldiers were sent to the
region to crush the mutiny, and 29 men finished by deserting. Lépine, “La participation des Canadiens
Français à la Guerre de 1812”, pp. 111–129.
42 Resistance to militia duty, of course, spread far beyond the borders of Lower Canada. For a look at
how Upper Canadians responded (or failed to respond) to militia duty, see Sheppard, Plunder, Profits,
and Paroles.
43 See National Archives of Canada [hereafter NAC], Collection Baby, MG 24 L3, vol. 43, testimony of
Captain Thibodeau, August 20, 1812, pp. 28316–28318. See also testimony of Colonel St. Dizier,
August 20, 1812, p. 28313 (all testimonies quoted hereafter are found in this collection).
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mander of the battalion, Colonel St. Dizier, sent Major Leprohon, along with
two captains and 30 militiamen, to the region to apprehend the deserters and
to restore order. The party marched to the parish and arrested Léveillé, a habi-
tant who had persistently ignored demands that he present himself for militia
duty. But when Léveillé was brought to Captain Binet’s custody for detention,
a group of men surrounded the carriage in which he was being held and
demanded his release. Feeling that it was impossible to defy the angry and
armed crowd, Major Leprohon released the prisoner, and the crowd yelled out
“vive le roi” in celebration of its first victory.44
Realizing their collective power, groups of habitants went from parish to
parish attempting to convince as many men as possible to assemble at
Lachine, sometimes with the help of intimidation. In the most extreme cases,
some witnesses claimed to have been threatened with having their houses
burnt down if they did not comply with the crowd’s wishes.45 The next morn-
ing, on the first of July, a crowd gathered at Lachine that contained habitants
from all of the parishes of the region (St-Charles, Pointe-Claire, Ste-Gene-
viève, Île-Bizarre, Ste-Anne, Vaudreuil, Les Cèdres, and Coteau, among oth-
ers), and two representatives were sent to Montreal to find out the “truth”
about the Militia Act.46 The crowd grew to about 400 men, roughly 200 of
whom were armed, and some talked about gathering as many as 1,500 the
following day. At various points during the demonstration, the crowd yelled
“vive le roi”, prompting Chaboillez, a government agent, to reply that the
habitants’ cheers for the King were blasphemous.47
As the crowd grew more and more agitated, members of the Committee of
Montreal48 worried about the explosive potential of the outbreak and the pos-
sibility of a chain reaction throughout the region.49 There was no option,
Committee members reasoned, except to crush the rebellion. They decided
that magistrate Thomas McCord should go to Lachine accompanied by the
light company of the 49th Regiment, a detachment of artillery, and two field
pieces. As soon as he arrived, McCord chastised the crowd for its behaviour;
44 NAC, Collection Baby, MG 24 L3, vol. 43, “Jugement du Juge Panet dans une cause de mutinerie à
Lachine” [hereafter “Jugement du Juge Panet”], p. 28290. See also Wallot, Un Québec qui bougeait,
pp. 110–111.
45 Hyacinthe Groux, for example, stated that Prégeau had told him that, if he did not go to Binet’s house,
“il mettrait la feu à la maison et grange des père et mère du temoin” (testimony of Hyacinthe Groux,
August 21, 1812, p. 28321).
46 Wallot, Un Québec qui bougeait, pp. 113–115. The two representatives, Captain Thibodeau and
François Rapin, took an inexplicably long time to return from Montreal, and only arrived after the
crowd had been dispersed by the military.
47 See testimony of Chaboillez, September 22, 1812, pp. 28334–28335.
48 The Committee of Montreal was formed of the members of Lower Canada’s Executive Council who
resided in Montreal.
49 James McGill heard word that 500 people had gathered to protest against conscription at Ste. Gene-
viève, behind Pointe Claire, at the same time as the incident at Lachine. See Stanley Brice Frost,
James McGill of Montreal (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995), pp.
140–141.
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when the crowd refused to disperse, he read the Riot Act and instructed Major
Plenderleath, the commanding officer, to order that an artillery round be fired
above the heads of the rioters.50 The crowd responded with small arms fire,
prompting the troops to fire another volley, first above the heads of the rioters
and then directly into the crowd; remarkably, only one man died and another
was seriously wounded. The following day, 450 members of the Montreal
militia marched to Pointe Claire and then to St. Laurent, arresting 24 of the
rioters (bringing the total number to 37), and others came to Montreal on their
own to turn themselves in.51 The militia that marched to the disturbed
regions, commanded by Captain John Richardson, was composed of roughly
equal numbers of French- and English-speaking soldiers.52 The use of militia
drawn from one segment of the population to quell problems in another
region openly displayed some of the cleavages of Lower Canadian society.
That an urban militia unit, composed of a large number of anglophones,
marched into a rural and francophone region must have reinforced the habi-
tants’ feeling of being repressed by an outside and alien force.
As a result of the riot, 15 of the insurgents were charged and brought to
trial at the Court of the King’s Bench in Montreal. The trial took place on
August 19 to 21 and September 22, 1812, and the defendants were all found
guilty.53 A close analysis of the trial records of those arrested during and after
the protest reveals a great deal about the tense climate that existed in Lower
Canada in the summer of 1812. What becomes clear is that the rural habitants
conceived of loyalty in a drastically different way than did their middle-class
counterparts or the Catholic clergy.54 While the French-Canadian elite wor-
50 See the description of the riot in the Montreal Herald, July 4, 1812.
51 Robert Christie, Memoirs of the administration of the colonial government of Lower Canada by Sir
James Henry Craig and Sir George Prevost: from the year 1807 until the year 1815: comprehending
the military and naval operations in the Canadas during the late war with the United States of Amer-
ica (1818), pp. 44–45.
52 Frost, James McGill of Montreal, p. 141.
53 Jacques Trottier, Louis Paiement, and Noël Legault dit Deslauriers were found guilty of “riot and res-
cue” and sentenced to two years in prison with fines ranging from £20 to £100 and were bound over
to be of good behaviour. Eustache Beneche dit La Victoire, Jean-Baptiste Prégeau, Pierre Chamail-
lard, and Bazile Legault Desloriers were convicted for “inciting persons to assemble riotously and
seditiously and to oppose His Majesty’s government and the Execution of the law and certain Statutes
of this Province”. They were given sentences ranging from one to two years in prison and fines of
between £15 and £25 and were bound over to be of good behaviour. Joseph Sicard, Luc Courville,
François Courville, Guillaume Mallet, Jean-Baptiste Thivierge, Joseph Brunet, Bernard Courville,
and Joseph Binet were found guilty “de s’être illicitement assemblés à Lachine, avec quatre cents
autres personnes, armés de fusils, et d’être restés ainsi et armés pendant quatre heures, au grand dan-
ger du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté”. They were sentenced from one to two years in prison, fined
from £10 to £100, and bound over to be of good behaviour. Wallot, Un Québec qui bougeait, pp. 127–
128.
54 It almost goes without saying that Lower Canada’s English-speaking elite was worried and appalled
by the incident. Robert Christie used similar language, referring to the crowd as a “mob” and to the
insurgents as “deluded men”. Christie, Memoirs of the administration of the colonial government of
Lower Canada, p. 45.
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ried about defending the French-Canadian nation, the rural habitants were
deeply disturbed by the infringement upon community values and the break-
ing of a moral contract between the rulers and the ruled.
For Judge Panet, the judge of the trial, the riot was despicable and repre-
hensible, and he refused to believe that it reflected the true sentiments of the
habitants. In his judgement, he paternalistically chastised the rioters for not
realizing that their revolt would be met with determined resistance on the
part of those who had a stake in the existing social system.55 It was even
more astounding, he noted, that the habitants did not realize how well off
they actually were under the British government; if they needed proof, he
told them, they need just consult their fathers. Panet could not understand
how
l’idée d’une guerre civile a t’elle pu entrer dans l’idée d’un Canadien. Les Cana-
diens qui vivent si heureux sous le gouvernement Britannique, sans taxes, sans
impôts, protégés dans leur religion qu’ils exercent librement ou plutôt qu’ils
négligent beaucoup trop, cette religion qui n’enseigne que des devoirs que vous
ne remplissez qu’imparfaitement. Depuis 52 ans que vous vivez sous le gou-
vernement actuel, quelles plaintes ozeriez-vous faire contre ce gouvernement?56
Unable to believe that the insurgents could really have wanted to destroy the
very government that “fait notre bonheur”, the judge attributed the actions of
the habitants to an “error” that had resulted when ill-intentioned people
manipulated and took advantage “de l’ignorance et de la crédulité des gens de
la campagne pour les tromper et les rendre coupables”.57 For members of the
French-Canadian middle class, the insubordination of the habitants was at
once both incomprehensible and infuriating. A correspondent of Jacques
Viger, captain in the Canadian Voltigeurs, lashed out at the leaders of the
insurrection: “Que le diable les berce et ils dormiront bien.”58
Members of the Catholic clergy were also greatly disturbed and felt it nec-
essary to reinforce the message of loyalty and submission that they preached
to the people. In the days following the protest at Lachine, Lartigue was sent
to Lachine and Pointe Claire to preach the message of submission and obedi-
ence. Lartigue felt that he had to trace for the habitants “la ligne de vos
devoirs”. He spoke of “la fidelité, l’amour, l’obéissance que vous devez à
votre légitime souverain & au Gouvernement bienfaisant qui protège cette
55 According to Judge Panet, “Mais si vous vous revoltiez, croyez vous que vous pouriez le faire sans
épprouver de la résistance de la part de ceux qui sont attachés au gouvernement et interessés à la con-
servation de leurs biens, de leurs familles et de tout ce qu’ils ont de cher au monde” (“Jugement du
Juge Panet”, p. 28296).
56 “Jugement du Juge Panet”, pp. 28296–28297.
57 Ibid., p. 28298.
58 Archives du Séminaire, Québec, Fond Viger-Verreau, MA Saderdache Bleue, vol. 2, P32/0–140, p.
152, H. Heney to Jacques Viger, September 29, 1812.
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Province”.59 Even when the government was unjust, the habitants had to
respect and obey its authority because submission to authority was “la volonté
de Dieu”.60 What had the British government not given the French-Canadian
people, he asked? Had they forgotten that it was their religious duty to submit
to all those who governed them? To ensure that there was no misunderstand-
ing, Lartigue concluded his speech at Pointe Claire by asking all of the parish-
ioners to repeat slowly after him a heartfelt declaration of their loyalty to their
beloved King.61
While many sources outline what exactly took place at Lachine, the signif-
icance and impact of the violent occurrences, and the motivations of those
involved, remain obscure and unexplored. Historians have generally por-
trayed the Lachine riot as being of little importance.62 For contemporaries,
however, both insurgents and members of the ruling classes responsible for
suppression of the riot, the event was neither secondary nor harmless. The
defendants and other witnesses claimed that they were protesting because
they thought that the Militia Act had not been properly passed, and, most
argued, they just wanted to know “the truth”. This explanation, while not
wholly untrue, does not do justice to the complexities of the rioters’ motiva-
tions. Judge Panet emphatically rejected this excuse. For Panet, the evidence
pointed to a premeditated insurrection:
[I]l paraît que le cri général et uniforme dans presque tous les quartiers du haut
de l’isle de Montréal a été il n’y aura point de Milice incorporée, nos jeunes
gens ne marcheront point – c’est-à-dire nous n’assisterons point le Gouverne-
ment et le Souverain qui protègent ce pays heureux depuis tant d’années et qui
nous ont procuré le pain et le bonheur. La preuve que l’opinion était générale
sur ce refus de laisser marcher les jeunes gens, se trouve constatée par une
foule de témoignages dans les différentes poursuites.63
Panet brushed aside the insurgents’ claim that they did not know whether the
Militia Act had been properly passed, saying this defence “n’était qu’un vain
prétexte que vous ne pouvez appuyer d’aucune bonne raison. Vos officiers de
59 “Sermon de M. Lartigue”, p.s.s. July 5, 1812, Pointe Claire, p. 303.
60 “Sermon de M. Lartigue”, July 12, 1812, Lachine, p. 308.
61 “Sermon de M. Lartigue”, p.s.s., July 5, 1812, Pointe Claire, pp. 304–305. After the riot at Lachine,
the bishop sent a letter to the clergy thanking them, on behalf of the governor, for their efforts in forc-
ing the habitants to join the militia and to help quell the disturbances: “Son Excellence le Gouverneur
en Chef désire que je vous fasse connaître sa parfaite satisfaction de l’assistance qu’il a reçue de votre
part, tant dans la levée des milices, que dans le maintien de la subordination, qui règne parmi elles”
(“Lettre Circulaire, J. O. Ev. de Québec à messieurs les curés”, October 6, 1812, p. 93).
62 For Fernand Ouellet, the events at Lachine deserve merely a passing mention as an isolated event
“without any great general significance” (Ouellet, Economic and Social History of Quebec, pp. 237–
238). According to Michelle Guitard, the Lachine riot was “secondary in the whole picture” of
recruitment (Guitard, The Militia of the Battle of Châteauguay, p. 30).
63 “Jugement du Juge Panet”, pp. 28284–28285.
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Milice doivent vous avoir informés que les lois de Milice étaient en pleine
vigueur.” If the object of the gathering was simply to present a petition, he
asked, why was it necessary to advance into the city with upwards of 500
men armed with sticks and guns?64 After a close examination of all the evi-
dence on the subject, the judge concluded that the object of “tous ceux qui
sont rassemblés à la Chine était de vous opposer à la loi de Milice et au gou-
vernement qui vous appellait, en vertu de cette loi à la défense de votre pays
menacé par l’ennemy”. Even worse, he argued, some of the insurgents had
begun talking about starting a civil war.65
Judge Panet was not the only one to feel that the events at Lachine repre-
sented an extremely dangerous situation that needed to be handled with force.
In Stephen Sewell’s 1815 collection of letters to the Montreal Herald, he
described the state of the Montreal militia at the beginning of the war. While
mentioning that the Sedentary Militia marched in Montreal’s Champ de Mars
throughout the opening months of the conflict, Sewell pointed to the signifi-
cant problems in conscripting the Select Embodied Militia. Sewell thought it
important to point out that, without a swift application of military force (a
decision made in Prevost’s absence), the consequences of the riot at Lachine
could have been disastrous. From the moment that the insurrection was
crushed, he stated, “matters took quite a different turn”. Had the Montreal
Committee of the Executive Council not immediately resorted to force, or had
the Committee waited for Prevost’s return, “the infection of insurrection
might have spread like wild fire, and Pointe Claire and Nouvelle Beauce, been
joined together by the intermediate parishes; for the multitude of every coun-
try is giddy, and there are always self styled Patriots ready to blow the coals”.66
From the Perspective of the Insurgents
In all of their attacks on the actions of the habitants, members of the French-
Canadian middle class, the clergy, and Judge Panet made no attempt to
understand the rioters’ motivations. Judge Panet believed that the “simple”
habitants had been tricked by “ill-intentioned leaders”, and Lartigue simply
felt that the parishioners were not behaving as good Catholics. What neither
considered was that the insurgents were acting according to their own under-
standings of the world and of their communities. With few primary docu-
64 Ibid., pp. 28285, 28292. Judge Panet, after listening to many witnesses recount their versions of the
events, rejected the argument that the habitants were just trying to petition the government. Thomas
McCord, for example, told the habitants that they were not following the proper procedure for a peti-
tion and that he would be happy to petition on their behalf if a small group came to see him the fol-
lowing day. In response to McCord, “ils ont repliqué qu’ils voulaient avoir leur gens et qu’avec
requête ou sans requête ils les auraient toujours” (Transq. par Mr. Stewart, testimony of Ante Lange,
September 22, 1812, p. 28331).
65 “Jugement du Juge Panet”, pp. 28294–28295. According to the testimony of Pierre Roi de Lapensée,
a militia captain, when he asked whether the rioters were planning to go as far as civil war, the rioters
responded, “Ma foi, oui ... nous croyons bien que ça viendra là” (testimony of Pierre Roi de Lapen-
sée, August 19, 1812, p. 28306).
66 Sewell, “To the Editor of the Montreal Herald”, April 1815, in The Letters of Veritas, pp. 10–11.
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ments written by the largely illiterate habitants, it is impossible to reconstruct
an accurate understanding of their views of society and of social relations
more generally. In the case of the rural habitants who openly defied the
authority of the British Crown and of their own clerical leaders at Lachine,
the trial records of those charged in the incident offer a rare glimpse into the
habitants’ understanding of the world.
Many historians have explored the meaning of popular disturbances for the
poor and have probed the role that the popular classes play in the larger work-
ings of the social system. For E. P. Thompson, all elements of society contrib-
ute to form a “structured set of relations, in which the State, the Law, the
libertarian ideology, the ebullitions and direct actions of the crowd, all per-
form roles intrinsic to that system, and within limits assigned by that sys-
tem”.67 In Lower Canada at the beginning of the nineteenth century, as in
eighteenth-century England, the hegemony of the ruling class “did not
envelop the lives of the poor”,68 and the popular classes played an important
role in the larger social system. Often, protests acted as an outlet for popular
grievances, and they served to warn officials of growing discontent among
the masses. Terrence Crowley demonstrates that popular disturbances in
early French Canada were both common and, in a way, necessary to the func-
tioning of the social system. At various points in the eighteenth century,
crowds assembled to demand lower food prices, an end to forced labour, and
redress for various other injustices. Crowds often had a gender dimension;
“bread riots” in both Europe and North America were composed largely of
women,69 just as other crowds, like the one in the Lachine riot, were predom-
inantly composed of men. For Crowley, crowds in early French Canada
“were not simply spasmodic reactions of mindless people succumbing to
momentary whims or losing themselves in the collective identity of the
crowd”, but were composed of people who sought “remedy to immediate but
well-defined grievances”.70 Seeing collective acts of violence in the early
nineteenth century from the light of contemporary elites, as “deluded mobs”,
therefore, is at once a distortion of the historical record and an insult to those
who lived through the period.71
While it is impossible to know for certain what led the habitants to defy
67 E. P. Thompson, “Eighteenth-century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?”, Social His-
tory, vol. 3, no. 2 (May 1978), pp. 161–162.
68 Ibid., p. 163.
69 Crowley, “ ‘Thunder Gusts’ ”, pp. 19–20. See also E. P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the
English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century”, Past and Present, no. 50 (February 1971); Barbara Clark
Smith, “Food Rioters and the American Revolution”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, vol. 51,
no. 1 (January 1994), pp. 3–38.
70 Crowley, “ ‘Thunder Gusts’ ”, p. 23.
71 According to Scott See, moreover, to “many people in western Europe and North America, a worthy
cause might provide justification enough for collective violence”. He continues, “Riots were used as a
social or moral weapon, a tool to insure the rights of the common folk.” Scott See, “Nineteenth-Cen-
tury Collective Violence: Toward a North American Context”, Labour/ Le Travail, vol. 39 (Spring
1997), pp. 25–26.
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military authorities at Lachine, partial answers lie in the trial records of the
apprehended insurgents. The court records are full of “character” witnesses
who testified that the defendants were of “good character”. When speaking of
Eustache Beneche dit La Victoire, charged with inciting persons to riot, for
example, a witness for the defence, Jacque Sarazin, stated that “le prisonnier
a toujours joui d’un bon caractère et appartient à une bonne famille”.72
Joseph Martin, for his part, vouched for Louis Paiement, charged with “riot
and rescue”, by stating that Paiement was “un jeune homme de bon caractère
qui a toujours fait son devoir”.73 And M. Gauthier began his testimony by
stating that Luc Courville, arrested for his presence at the riot, was the father
of nine children and had “un caractère sans reproche”.74
Among those present at the demonstration was at least one captain in the
militia, Captain Binet.75 He was at the assembly for the majority of the day
and, although he claimed to have attempted to persuade the habitants to
leave,76 was clearly complicit in the events that took place.77 It is interesting,
however, that the habitants convinced Binet to take part in the assembly, not
the other way around. According to Jacques Trottier, who was later found
guilty of “riot and rescue”, he and a few others “ont arreté chez le Capitaine
Binet pour l’engager d’aller avec eux”. They wanted Binet to go with them,
Trottier argued, because they hoped that “des gens respectables fussent
présent à une pareille assemblée”.78 By rejecting the orders of some military
officials and by taking the initiative to encourage the captain to participate,
the habitants reversed the roles that predominated in the military and took a
leading rather than a subordinate part in the developments.
In the context of rural Lower Canada, according to Colin Coates, militia
officers, like priests, “served as intermediaries between the local inhabitants
and the external world”.79 While the habitants wanted the captain present to
72 Testimony of Jacque Sarazin, August 20, 1812, pp. 28318–28319.
73 Testimony of Joseph Martin, August 19, 1812, p. 28308.
74 Testimony of M. Gauthier, September 22, 1812, p. 28348.
75 It should be remembered that, at this time, a majority of subaltern militia officers were habitants. See
Christian Dessureault and Roch Legault, “Évolution organisationnelle et sociale de la milice séden-
taire canadienne : le cas du bataillon de Saint-Hyacinthe, 1808–1830”, Revue de la Société historique
du Canada, vol. 8 (1997), pp. 87–112.
76 After Mr. Ross and M. Chaboilliez, the government agents, informed the crowd that the Militia Act
was in force and that the assembly was illegal, Binet reportedly spoke to the crowd: “Mes enfans, on
n’a point a repliquer sur les bonnes raisons de ces Messieurs, je crois qu’il est à propos de nous
retirer.” Judging by the captain’s behaviour the night before, when he had allowed a crowd of men to
gather around his house to disrupt Major Leprohon, however, there is reason to doubt this testimony.
Testimony of Joseph Theoret, September 22, 1812, pp. 28355–28356.
77 Several witnesses stated that they saw Captain Binet in the crowd. Testimony of Joseph Landreman,
September 22, 1812, p. 28339; testimony of Joseph Desautel and Ante Garnier, September 22, 1812,
p. 28340.
78 Testimony of Jacques Trottier, August 22, 1812, pp. 28353–28354.
79 Colin M. Coates, The Metamorphoses of Landscape and Community in Early Quebec (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), p. 94.
French Canadians and the Beginning of the War of 1812 53
reinforce their case in the face of external authorities, the captain was also
subject to greater blame for the conduct of the habitants. Judge Panet used
extremely harsh language to condemn Binet’s neglect of duty: “Le Capitaine
Binet que l’on représente comme un homme respectable, un homme jaloux
de remplir son devoir pour le Service du Roy [...] [a] resté avec eux [les habi-
tants] presque pendant toute la scène sans interposer votre autorité, sans cher-
cher à les arrêter.”80 On July 13, 1812, the Montreal Gazette reported that
“His Excellency the Commander in Chief” had “judged it expedient for the
safety of His Majesty’s service to strike him from the list of Officers of Mili-
tia, Joseph Binet”, as he was “unworthy, by his bad conduct, of fulfilling such
an important duty, and of which depend almost always, the good or bad con-
duct of Militiamen”.81
It is also important to note that the divisions between the two parties, the
insurgents and the military forces that repressed them, were not primarily of
a linguistic nature. True, nearly all of the rioters were francophone, and the
magistrate and the regular British soldiers who accompanied him spoke
English, but the crowd was protesting the enforcement of military conscription
and the forceful removal of the community’s young men, a position supported
by the French- and English-speaking elites alike. The military party that first
came into the community to arrest the resisters, for example, was led by Major
Leprohon, a French-Canadian militia officer. As well, of course, the militia
that marched to the region the day after the riot was composed of both English-
and French-speaking soldiers. The rioters, moreover, did not automatically
exclude anglophones from their group. Pierre Chamaillard, found guilty of
“inciting persons to assemble riotously”, tried hard to convince Robert
McGregor to join the crowd to retrieve the young militia conscripts. McGregor
responded that he did not have any “young ones” to free, but he agreed to join
the group if it could be proven that the Militia Act had not been properly
passed.82 Although McGregor did not stay with the group for long,83 the fact
that he was invited to join the crowd in the first place demonstrates that the con-
flict was not primarily focused around issues of language or ethnicity.
From the trial records, it is clear that those who participated in the riot did
so because they felt that a “contract” between themselves and the government
80 “Jugement du Juge Panet”, p. 28293. Coates notes a similar case of militia officers being held respon-
sible for the conduct of the people residing in their area. When, during the time leading up to the War
of 1812, rumour spread in a community about the possibility of local militiamen being sent to Ger-
many, “Colonel Thomas Coffin blamed this problem on the lack of vigilance and action of two cap-
tains, and he recommended that their commissions be revoked” (Coates, The Metamorphoses of
Landscape, p. 94).
81 Reported by F. Vassal de Monviel, Adjutant-General of Militia, Montreal Gazette, July 13, 1812.
82 Testimony of Rob McGregor, August 21, 1812, pp. 28322–28323.
83 When he suggested that the crowd should send five or six people to gather information instead of
immediately assembling, one of the habitants responded, indicating that he was not a member of the
community that was going to fight: “Allez vous en vous n’êtes pas des nôtres.” Testimony of Rob
McGregor, August 21, 1812, p. 28324.
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had been broken. In Lower Canada, according to Coates, a hierarchical
understanding of society “persisted into the early nineteenth century”.84
Rather than openly challenge the hierarchical structure, he argues, habitants
often protested to demand that their social superiors fulfil their obligations to
the community.85 Virtually all of the witnesses and defendants who took part
in the collective action at Lachine stated that they believed the Militia Act had
not been legitimately passed, and they were all upset that they had not been
allowed to voice their grievances to the governor. Fifteen days before the
uprising, the habitants had gone to Captain Thibodeau asking him to petition
the government, but Thibodeau had refused because he was afraid of damag-
ing his reputation as an upstanding citizen.86 By declining to give voice to
their concerns, Thibodeau was neglecting his responsibilities to the habitants
and thus increasing their frustration and the dissent in the region. When ten-
sions reached a boiling point a few weeks later, the habitants decided to take
matters into their own hands. Upon hearing the news that one of the young
members of the community had been arrested, they quickly formed their own
conclusions: the young Léveillé was not guilty of any crime and should be
freed.87
As both the political and clerical elites attempted to persuade the habitants
to remain loyal to the “French-Canadian nation”, the habitants placed their
primary loyalty to the defence of their families and their local communities.
To defend French-Canadian values, the clergy and the bourgeoisie had
argued, it was necessary to fight for the British, but this reasoning had little
appeal to those who lived in highly localized rural communities. As Gerald
Friesen has argued, systems of communication and transportation were at the
very centre of the historical experience, and, before the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, “textual-settler” communities were deeply rooted in place and still
relied heavily on oral forms of communication. Popular protests in this
period were therefore very much based on this “communication context”, and
French-Canadian habitants, like other rural people, “were limited in their
power to effect change both by the rules laid down by the established order
and by their inability to contact, debate with, and mobilize” large segments of
the population. Lacking the communication structures to forge “long-term,
organized, cooperative attempts to restructure the economy or to redistribute
public power”, popular protests focused on matters of more immediate con-
84 Coates, The Metamorphoses of Landscape, p. 95.
85 Ibid., p. 89.
86 Testimony of Captain Thibodeau, August 20, 1812, p. 28316. See also the testimony of François
Rapin, September 22, 1812, p. 28343. According to Pointe Claire resident Amable Legault, three
weeks before the incident at least 200 habitants went to Thibodeau wanting to “dresser une requête au
gouverneur pour savoir si le Bill était sanctionné” (testimony of Amable Legault, September 22,
1812, p. 28344).
87 Judge Panet clearly recognized the affront to the proper hierarchy that had taken place; in his judge-
ment, he lashed out at the accused: “était-ce a vous a juger si ce Leveillé avait été arreté bien ou mala-
propos?” (“Jugement du Juge Panet”, p. 28289).
French Canadians and the Beginning of the War of 1812 55
cern, like the price of bread, the imposition of labour, or, in the example of the
Lachine riot, the infringement upon community rights.88
When military officials were sent to arrest young conscripts, therefore,
older members of the community felt that the authorities had overstepped
their bounds. Outraged, they considered it part of their duty to protect the
youth, and they were prepared to resort to armed resistance if necessary. The
habitants’ response to the outside intrusion relied on the collective memory
of the community and on the habitants’ own conceptions of gender roles. In
contrast to the war propaganda that encouraged habitants to follow in the
great military tradition of French Canadians, for example, they responded
angrily to a government agent by yelling that “nos pères ne faisaient pas
l’exercice et nous ne voulons pas d’exercice”.89 The rioters, all men, also
clearly felt that it was their responsibility as males to protect their families
and their community against outsiders. Ironically, as the clergy and other
members of the Lower Canadian elite employed highly gendered rhetoric to
convince French-Canadian men to fight for the larger interests of nation and
Empire, the men felt that it was their duty to protect their families and com-
munities. In this instance, the two sites of possible loyalty came into open
conflict.
For the habitants, the threat to the community did not come from an
impending American invasion, but from military officials who arrived to
arrest conscripts who had failed to report for duty. The possibility of an
American invasion was far from the minds of the habitants — in all the tes-
timony provided at the trials of the rioters, the United States was not men-
tioned a single time. But the men of the community were furious that the
youth were being forced to fight: “si les jeunes gens voulaient aller, qu’ils
yraient mais qu’ils ne soufriraient pas qu’on les y forçat.”90 One of the major
complaints made to officials in Montreal was that the habitants found it
“extraordinaire que des personnes armées fussent envoyées pour prendre
leurs gens avec ordre de tirer sur eux”.91 According to the testimony of Louis
Chaboilliez, Guillaume Mallet, one of the leaders of the assembly,92 was a
moderate who resorted to violence because of the breach of family and com-
munity rights: “il paraissait seulement fort en colère contre le Maj. Leprohon
qui était venu chez lui armé avec son propre frère pour poursuivre les prison-
niers.”93 When asked why they had assembled at Lachine, Bernard Courville
and Mallet responded together that they wanted “de ravoir leur miliciens qui
88 Gerald Friesen, Citizens and Nation: An Essay on History, Communication, and Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2000), pp. 95–96.
89 See testimony of Louis Chaboilliez, September 22, 1812, pp. 28334–28335.
90 Testimony of Major Jean Philippe Leprohon, August 19, 1812, p. 28302.
91 Testimony of Captain Thibodeau, August 20, 1812, p. 28317.
92 According to McCord, “Mallet paraissait très animé et changeait souvent de place qu’il paraissait que
la foule l’écoutait avec attention” (testimony of Thomas McCord, September 22, 1812, p. 28339).
93 Testimony of Louis Chaboilliez, September 22, 1812, pp. 28335–28336.
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étaient à la Prairie – que Mr. Leprohon était venu jusque dans leurs greniers
avec des tizons de feu et qu’il était accompagné des gens armés”.94 With ten-
sions already running high, the arrival of the armed officials attempting to
arrest the younger members of the community triggered the collective act of
resistance. The men simply felt that they could take no more insults.
Why, then, did the crowd shout its support for the King? The riot was not
the result of revolutionary fervour, nor was it necessarily a revolt against the
government or the King. When British regulars marched to Lachine and fired
into the crowd, the insurgents almost immediately dispersed and ran for
cover; when the Montreal militia marched into the disturbed region the fol-
lowing day and arrested 24 men, no one resisted and no crowd formed in their
defence. The riot was not an anti-government rally, but a defensive reaction
by a community whose members felt themselves under threat. When a seri-
ous military force arrived, the crowd was neither ready nor willing to engage
in a sustained conflict. The rioters were not protesting either for or against the
“nation” because, for them, the “national community” did not yet exist, and
they shouted their support of the King because they did not feel themselves to
be challenging the hierarchical order. The habitants’ loyalty to the King con-
trasted with their anger towards local officials who were abusing their power
and trampling on long-established community rights.95 Drawing on a long
tradition of resistance to militia duty, and an even longer tradition of popular
protest, they had the goal of re-establishing a sense of mutual rights and obli-
gations between themselves and their political and military leaders.
This does not mean, however, that the habitants’ grievances were not real
or that the danger of the riot spreading was not serious. The event at Lachine
can only be understood when placed in the context in which it occurred.
While the rioters looked inward towards their local communities, the con-
frontation formed part of a much larger, yet uncoordinated, resistance to mili-
tia duty. The riot was the largest and most dramatic instance of a problem that
was much more widespread: a significant number of rural French-Canadian
farmers saw no need and had no desire to leave their communities behind to
fight in a war that they considered did not concern them. In the summer of
1812 the government showed that it would not hesitate to use force if habi-
tants refused to respond dutifully to military conscription, and the govern-
ment’s determination to reinforce its authority with violence ensured that
there were no more collective uprisings against militia conscription. In
November 1812 Prevost wrote that the “Canadian Peasantry” had “materially
94 Ibid., pp. 28333–28334.
95 According to Allan Greer, “A basically royalist political vocabulary does not imply a docile accep-
tance of authority. People who have been taught to regard the distant king as a father-figure who has
the best interests of his subjects at heart, often tend to conclude, when things go badly, that exploitive
officials, merchants, or aristocrats are the monarch’s enemies as well as their own.” See Allan Greer,
The Patriots and the People: The Rebellion of 1837 in Rural Lower Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1993), p. 193.
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changed their character and disposition” and that “their former prejudices
and distrust have been removed”.96 While habitants did not universally com-
ply with the raising of the militia after 1812, the largest and most violent
demonstrations against militia duty had passed. Only by taking seriously
these acts of collective resistance that occurred in the spring and summer of
1812, however, do we come closer to understanding the meaning of the war
from the eyes of those who lived through it.
96 Cited in Taft Manning, The Revolt of French Canada, pp. 396–397.
